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Special]

agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The circuit
court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the
agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have
been-prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, decisions or order are: "(1) In violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon
unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5)
Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse 49of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion." 1
XVII. INSURANCE LAW

A.

InterpretingPolicy Language

In Helfeldt v. Robinson,1150 Justice McHugh was forced to determine the
effect of an exception to exclusion in a liability policy that was voided by other
exclusions in the policy. The court held:
Although an exclusion in a comprehensive general automobile and
property liability insurance contract contained an exception for
"warranty of fitness or quality of the named insured's products or
a warranty that work performed by or on behalf of the named
insured will be done in a workmanlike manner," that exception to
the contract's exclusion provision did not extend insurance
coverage to a contractor for the defective construction of a home
where the insurance contract contained other exclusions
precluding insurance coverage and the insurance contract in
question
was a liability insurance policy and not a builder's risk
115
policy.
In Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.," 52 the court held that
"[t]he term 'occurrence' in a limitation of liability clause within an automobile
liability insurance policy refers unmistakably to the resulting event for which the
insured becomes liable and not to some antecedent cause(s) of the injury."" 5 3

1149

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1150

290 S.E.2d 896 (W. Va. 1981).

1151

Id. at Syl.

1152

332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985).

1153

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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In Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Burke," 54 Justice

McHugh determined the meaning of language in a life insurance, as it related to
beneficiaries of the policy. Justice McHugh stated that "[w]ith reference to the
beneficiary(ies), it has frequently been said that a policy of life insurance is
testamentary in nature, and the rules for interpreting a will may guide the courts in
ascertaining the legal effect of a clause in a life insurance policy designating the
beneficiary(ies). ' 1155
, The court held that "[t]he term 'children' ordinarily does not
include stepchildren, but it may include stepchildren when a contrary intent is
found from additional language or circumstances." 1156 Justice McHugh determined
that "[a] class description such as 'children' ordinarily raises a latent ambiguity if
there are, for example, stepchildren, so that evidence of the testator's or insured's
relations with and attitude toward them is admissible to determine whether it was
the testator's or insured's intent to include them in the gift. ' 1157 He concluded:
If a will was drafted by one who is not a lawyer, a court will be
more inclined to assume that the will was written in the language
of the lay person and will be more inclined to give effect to the
language of the will in accordance with the subjective sense
employed by the testator or testatrix, and not according to the
technical meaning of the language. The same principle applies to
other documents which contain dispositions of property which are
testamentary in nature, such as the beneficiary designation clause
of an insurance policy providing death benefits." 58
In Marshall v. Fair,1159 Justice McHugh ruled that "[b]odily injury and
property damage 'arising out of uninsured premises, as that phrase is used in an
uninsured premises exclusion provision, refers to the condition of the uninsured
premises and does not exclude coverage for the allegedly tortious acts of the
insured committed on either such
uninsured premises or on premises closely related
60
to the uninsured premises." 11
B.

Renewal of Policy

In Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Shaw, 116 1 Justice McHugh examined the
statutory basis for renewal of specific types of insurance policies. The court held:
1154

368 S.E.2d 301 (W. Va. 1988).

1155
1156

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1157

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1158

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1159

416 S.E.2d 67 (W. Va. 1992).

1160

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1161

337 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 1985).
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Where an insurer has issued to its insured an automobile liability
or physical damage insurance policy, which policy has been in
existence for two consecutive years or longer, the insured is
entitled to the renewal protection of W.Va. Code, 33-6A-4 [1980],
i.e., that an insurer "may not fail to renew an outstanding
automobile liability or physical damage insurance policy which
has been in existence for two consecutive years or longer" except
for the reasons enumerated in that statute; furthermore, an
insured's existing renewal protection under W.Va. Code, 33-6A-4
[1980], applies with regard to additional policies issued by the
insurer for additional or replacement automobiles acquired by the
insured, and for such renewal protection the additional policies
need not have
been in existence for "two consecutive years or
62
longer."11
C.

Employee FidelityInsurancePolicy

Justice McHugh explained in Commercial Bank of Bluefield v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co." 63 that
[e]mployee fidelity insurance (sometimes called fidelity guaranty
insurance) is a contract whereby one for consideration agrees to
indemnify the insured against loss arising from want of integrity,
fidelity or honesty of employees or other persons holding
positions of trust. The insurer is liable to
1 the insured only in the
event of a loss sustained by the insured."6
D.

West VirginiaGuarantyAssociation Act

Justice McHugh made several observations regarding the Guaranty
Association Act in Cannelton Industries, Inc. v. Aetia Casualty & Surety Co. of
America.' 165 He said that "[t]he West Virginia Guaranty Association is not required
to notify insureds of the insolvent insurer unless the West Virginia Insurance
Commissioner requires that such notice be given pursuant to W.Va. Code,33-26-10(2)(a) [1970] of the West Virginia Guaranty Association Act." 1166 The
court subsequently held:
Pursuant to the West Virginia Guaranty Association Act,

1162

Id.at Syl. Pt.4.

1163

336 S.E.2d 552 (W. Va. 1985).

1164

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2.

1165

460 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1994).

1166

Id at Syl. Pt. 4.
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specifically, W.Va. Code, 33-26-8(1)(a) [1985], the West Virginia
Guaranty Association is "obligated to the extent of covered claims
existing prior to the determination of insolvency, and for such
claims arising within thirty days after the determination of
insolvency.... [However,] [n]otwithstanding any other provision

of this article, a covered claim shall not include any claim filed
with the guaranty fund after the final date set by the court for the
filing of claims
against the liquidator or receiver of an insolvent
' 116 7
insurer[.]
E.

Anti-Stacking Provision

Justice McHugh addressed anti-stacking language in an insurance policy in
the case of Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual InsuranceCo.11 8 In Shamblin, the court

held:
When an automobile liability insurance policy contains language
limiting the insurer's liability as the result of any one occurrence,
"[r]egardless of the number of . . . automobiles to which this

policy applies," the insured is not entitled to "stack" liability
coverages for each vehicle for which the insured has paid a
separate premium. In light of the explicit "anti-stacking"
language, the payment of a separate premium for each vehicle
does not create an ambiguity in11the
insurance policy which should
69
be resolved against the insurer.
Justice McHugh also clarified the legal legitimacy of anti-stacking
provisions in Shamblin. He held:
A limitation of liability clause within an automobile liability
insurance policy which limits coverage for any one occurrence,
regardless of the number of covered vehicles, does not violate any
applicable insurance statute or regulation, and there is no judicial
policy that prevents an insurer from so limiting its liability and yet
collecting a premium for each covered vehicle because each
premium is for the increased risk of an "occurrence. 1,1170
Justice McHugh addressed the impact of anti-stacking language on
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the case of State Automobile

1167

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5 (alterations in original).

1168

332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985).

1169

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (alteration in original).

1170

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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Mutual Insurance Co. v. Youler." 71 The court held that
[s]o-called "antistacking" language in automobile insurance
policies is void under W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, to the
extent that such language is purportedly applicable to uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage, and an insured covered
simultaneously by two or more uninsured or underinsured
motorist policy endorsements may recover under all of such
endorsements up to the aggregated or stacked limits of the same,
or up to the amount of the judgment obtained against the
uninsured or underinsured motorist, whichever is less, as a result
of one accident and injury." 72
Justice McHugh held in Millerv. Lemon

173 that

[a]nti-stacking language in an automobile insurance policy is valid
and enforceable as to uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage where the insured purchases a single insurance policy to
cover two or more vehicles and receives a multi-car discount on
the total policy premium. If no multi-car discount for uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage is apparent on the declarations
page of the policy, the parties must either agree or the court must
find that such a discount was given. In such event, the insured is
not entitled to stack the coverages of the multiple vehicles and
may only recover up to the policy limits set forth in the single
policy endorsement.'1 74
F.

Bad FaithSettlement

In Berry v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,1175 Justice McHugh
stated that "[p]unitive damages may be awarded to an insured if the insurer
actually knew that the claim was proper and the insured can prove that it was
willfully, maliciously and intentionally denied. Therefore, in such a case, it is not
error for a117
trial
court to give an instruction stating that punitive damages may be
6
awarded."

1171

396 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1990).

1172

Id.at Syl.Pt.
3.

1173

459 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1995).

1174

Id.at syl. Pt. 4.

1175

381 S.E.2d 367 (W. Va. 1989).

1176

ld.
at Syl. Pt. 5.
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Payment of Proceeds
The case of Arcuri v. GreatAmerican Insurance Co.1177 presented the issue

of payment of proceeds from a policy by an insurer, when a person is wrongfully
added to the policy as a beneficiary. Justice McHugh ruled:
W.Va. Code, 33-17-12 [1965], by providing that payment of the
proceeds under a fire insurance policy to the person or persons
designated in the policy fully discharges the insurer from all
claims under the policy, makes it inappropriate for an insurer,
which has wrongfully added an insured person to a fire insurance
policy, to merely tender the proceeds to the clerk of the court in a
pending action in which the parties are the joint payees of the
proceeds, namely, the only person properly designated in the
policy as an insured and another person, not properly designated
in the policy as an insured but who claims an interest in the
proceeds. The delay in payment to the person properly designated
as an insured would, in such a case, be attributable to the insurer's
wrongful designation of the additional insured person and the
insurer's failure to follow the statute 11on
payment to the person
78
designated in the policy as the insured.
In Jones v. Wesbanco Bank Parkersburg,1179 Justice McHugh explained
when a mortgagee on a deed of trust would be entitled to proceeds from a fire
insurance policy. The court held:
Where the lender under a deed of trust executed by a property
owner to secure a debt owing on the property is named as
mortgagee in a standard mortgage clause in a fire insurance
contract between an insurer and a property owner, it has an
independent and distinct contract with the insurer and is deemed
to be an insured to the extent of the balance due it from the
property owner. Thus, the right of the lender under a deed of trust
named as mortgagee to the insurance proceeds is determined at the
time of the fire loss to the extent of the balance due it from the
property owner.11 0
H.

Family Use Policy Exclusion

Justice McHugh addressed the validity of family use policy exclusions in
1177

342 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1986).

1178

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1179

460 S.E.2d 627 (W. Va. 1995).

1180

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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automobile coverage in the case of Thomas v. NationwideMutual InsuranceCo. 181
He stated the following:
When an insurer issues an automobile insurance policy which
provides both liability and underinsured motorists coverage, but
which policy contains what is commonly referred to as a "family
use exclusion" for the underinsured motorist coverage, and when,
in a single car accident, the passenger/wife receives payments
under the liability coverage for the negligence of the
driver/husband, such exclusion is valid and not against the public
policy of this state. That exclusion, which excludes from the
definition of "underinsured motor vehicle" any automobile
owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a
relative, has the purpose of preventing underinsured coverage
from being converted into additional liability coverage." 82
L.

IntentionalInjury Policy Exclusion
Justice McHugh stated in Horace Mann InsuranceCo. v. Leeber 11 that
[t]here is neither a duty to defend an insured in an action for, nor a
duty to pay for, damages allegedly caused by the sexual
misconduct of an insured, when the liability insurance policy
contains a so-called "intentional injury" exclusion. In such a case
the intent of an insured to cause some injury will be inferred as a
matter of law.' 11

J.

InsuredPersonPolicy Exclusion

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of the validity of a clause excluding
an insured person in a homeowner's policy in Rich v. Allstate Insurance Co.11 1 He
stated that
[w]hen a homeowner's insurance policy excludes coverage to an
"insured person" and defines an "insured person" as a resident of
the named insured's household and a dependent person in the
named insured's care, a minor child who sustains bodily injury as
a result of the negligence of the named insured on the named
insured's premises, such minor child also being a resident of the
1181

425 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 1992).

1182

Id. at Syl. PL 2.

1183

376 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1988).

1184

Id. at Sy..
445 S.E.2d 249 (W. Va. 1994).

1185
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named insured's household and who is a dependent person in the
named insured's care, is not covered under the homeowner's
insurance policy. Such exclusionary language within the
homeowner's1 86insurance policy is not violative of the public policy
of this state.'
K.

Fire Insurance Mortgage Clause

Justice McHugh determined the status of a lender named as a mortgagee in
a fire insurance policy in the case of Firstbank Shinnston v. West Virginia
Insurance Co."487 The court held:

If a fire insurance contract between an insurer and a property
owner includes a standard mortgage clause naming as mortgagee
the lender under a deed of trust executed by the property owner to
secure a debt owing on the property, the lender under the deed of
trust pursuant to that clause has an independent and distinct
contract with the insurer, as if the lender under the deed of trust
had taken out a separate policy with the insurer, and is deemed to
be an insured
to the extent of the balance due it from the property
1188
owner.
L.

Per Person Liability Limit

Justice McHugh expounded upon the reach of a per person liability limit
provision in an automobile policy on a claim for loss of consortium in Federal
Kemper Insurance Co. v. Karlet. 189 He held:
When a person is bodily injured in an automobile accident, an
individual other than the bodily-injured person may also suffer
damages as a result of such accident through loss of consortium.
The claim for loss of consortium by an individual other than the
one suffering bodily injury as a result of an automobile accident is
generally recognized as arising out of the claim for damages of the
bodily-injured person. As a result, the claim of the bodily-injured
person and the claim for loss of consortium are covered within the
same per person limit of liability provisions under the automobile
insurance policy. More specifically, when the per person limit of
liability in a policy provides coverage for "all damages arising out
of bodily injury sustained by one person as a result of one
1186

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1187

408 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 1991).

1188

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1189

428 S.E.2d 60 (W. Va. 1993).
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accident," both the claim of the bodily injured person and the
claim for loss of consortium are covered within the same per
person limit of liability, and recovery for both claims may not
exceed the fixed amount of the maximum limit of damages under
the per person limit of liability. If, however, there is language in
the policy which includes loss of consortium as a separate bodily
injury, such loss of consortium claim is entitled to a separate per
person limit of liability. 1 90
In Davis v. Foley," 9' Justice McHugh distinguished per person limit from
per occurrence limit within the context of a wrongful death action. The court held:
The damages in a wrongful death action arise out of the death of
the decedent thereby making a wrongful death action a derivative
claim. As a result, when language in an insurance policy clearly
limits recovery of derivative claims to the per person limit, the per
occurrence limit does not apply even though "the surviving
spouse and children, including adopted children and stepchildren,
brothers, sisters, parents and any persons who were financially
dependent upon the decedent at the time of his or her death..."
are entitled to share in the recovery in a wrongful death action
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 55-7-6 [1992]. However, if there is
language in the insurance policy which includes damages from a
wrongful death as a separate bodily injury, then each person
recovering for
the wrongful death is entitled to a separate per
1192
person limit.
M.

Subrogation

In Berry v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,1 93 Justice McHugh
stated that "[w]here an insurer decides, after complete investigation, not to approve
payment to its insured based upon the allegedly tortious conduct of another party,
the insurer's claim that a subsequent settlement by the insured with the other party
violates the subrogation clause of the94 insurance contract by prejudicing the
insurer's subrogation rights is invalid. "11

1190

Il at Syl.

1191
1192

457 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1995).
IL at Syl. Pt. 4 (alteration in original).

1193

381 S.E.2d 367 (W. Va. 1989).

1194

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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Uninsured/UnderinsuredCoverage

In State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Youler, 195 Justice McHugh
addressed several issues concerning uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
The court initially that "[t]he notice provisions of an automobile insurance policy
ordinarily are activated in a case of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage,
not when there has been an accident, but when the insured, with reasonable
' 1196
diligence, ascertains that the alleged tortfeasor is uninsured or underinsured."
The court next held:
In an uninsured or underinsured motorist case, prejudice to the
investigative interests of the insurer is a factor to be considered,
along with the reasons for delay and the length of delay, in
determining the overall reasonableness in giving notice of an
accident. In the typical case, the insured must put on evidence
showing the reason for the delay in giving notice. Once this
prerequisite is satisfied, the insurer must then demonstrate that it
was prejudiced by the insured's failure to give notice sooner. If
the insurer fails to present evidence as to prejudice, then the
insured's failure to give notice sooner will not be a bar to the
insured's recovery. If the insurer puts on evidence of prejudice,
however, the reasonableness of the notice 1ordinarily
becomes a
97
question of fact for the fact finder to decide."
Justice McHugh concluded in Youler that
W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, on uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage, contemplates recovery, up to
coverage limits, from one's own insurer, of full compensation for
damages not compensated by a negligent tortfeasor who at the
time of the accident was an owner or operator of an uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicle. Accordingly, the amount of such
tortfeasor's motor vehicle liability insurance coverage actually
available to the injured person in question is to be deducted from
the total amount of damages sustained by the injured person, and
the insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage is liable for
the remainder
of the damages, but not to exceed the coverage
119 8
limits.

1195

396 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1990).

1196

Id. at Syl. PL 1.

1197

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1198

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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In Pristavecv. Westfield Insurance Co.," 99 Justice McHugh clarified when
underinsured motorist coverage is actually triggered. He held that
[i]n light of the preeminent public policy of the underinsured
motorist statute, which is to provide full compensation, not
exceeding coverage limits, to an injured person for his or her
damages not compensated by a negligent tortfeasor, this Court
holds that underinsured motorist coverage is activated under
W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, when the amount of such
tortfeasor's motor vehicle liability insurance actually available to
the injured person in question is less than the total amount of
damages sustained by the injured person, regardless of the
comparison between such liability insurance limits actually
available and the underinsured motorist coverage limits.1200
Justice McHugh held in Johnson by Johnson v. GeneralMotors Corp.1 2 1
that "[t]he collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of uninsured or
underinsured benefits since the benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement
which is independent of the tortfeasor; therefore, we overrule syllabus point 1 of
Cox v. Turner, 157 W.Va. 802, 207 S.E.2d 152 (1974) which held that uninsured
were not a collateral source under the then existing statutory
motorist benefits
1202
scheme."
Justice McHugh addressed several issues involving uninsured motorist
coverage in Cox v. Amick. 1203 He stated that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 33-6-31d [1993] a knowing and intelligent
rejection of optional uninsured and underinsured motorists
coverages by any named insured under an insurance policy creates
a presumption that all named insureds under the policy received
an effective offer of the optional coverages and that such person
exercised a knowing and intelligent rejection of such offer. The
rejection is binding on all persons insured under
named insured's
1204
the policy.
In Cox, the court also held:
When an insurance policy clearly and unambiguously provides
1199

400 S.E.2d 575 (W. Va. 1990).

1200

Id-at Syl. Pt. 5.

1201

438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993).

1202

Id at Syl. PL 4.

1203

466 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1995).

1204

IM.at Syl. PL 13.
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uninsured motorists coverage for damages suffered by the insured
or a relative from the "owner or driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle" if such damages have resulted from an accident arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor
vehicle, the insured or relative may not recover damages pursuant
to his or her uninsured motorists coverage from a person who was
not occupying an uninsured motor vehicle involved in the accident
when it occurred and who was not the owner or driver of the
uninsured motor vehicle involved in the accident even though
such person may be liable 1to20 5the insured or relative under other
appropriate causes of action.
0.

CommercialLiability Policy
Justice McHugh addressed issues involving a commercial liability policy

in Bruceton Bank v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Co. 120 6 The court held
that
[w]here, under a commercial general liability policy and a related
commercial umbrella liability policy issued to a bank, insurance
coverage is provided for certain injuries and damages caused by
an "occurrence" or an "incident," and the policies expressly
equate the terms "occurrence" and "incident" with an
"accident," no such insurance coverage, or duty to defend or
investigate by the insurer, arises, where the underlying case
against the bank, concerning the denial of a loan, is grounded
upon breach of contract and is in the nature of a lender liability
action. Although a case in the nature of a lender liability action
would, ordinarily, be foreign to the risk insured against as
reflected by such insurance policies, included in the consideration
of whether the insurer has a duty to defend is whether the
allegations in the complaint against the bank are reasonably
susceptible of an interpretation that the claim may be covered by
the terms of the insurance policies. To the extent that the syllabus
point in Farmers & Mechanics Mutual Fire Insurance Company v.
Hutzler, 191 W.Va. 559, 447 S.E.2d
22 (1994), differs from these
120 7
principles, it is hereby clarified.

1205

Id. at Syl. Pt. 14.

1206

486 S.E.2d 19 (W. Va. 1997).

1207

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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